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Abstract
This thesis examined four authoritarian regime types and their relationship with domestic
terrorism. It is argued that military authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience civil strife
than other forms of authoritarian regimes. In addition, this thesis challenges the notion that multiparty authoritarian regimes and civil strife are positively correlated. This study also
demonstrates the relationship between regime type and domestic terrorism when controlling for
when the country is experiencing civil war. To conduct this research, I used data from the
Global Terrorism Database, Correlates of War, and Hadenius and Teorell’s “Authoritarian
Regime Types Revisited”. The results demonstrate that military and one-party regimes are more
likely to experience domestic terrorism when engaged in a civil war, and found that the level of
development when interacted with the regime variables was also a significant indicator of
domestic terrorism. Therefore, the type of authoritarian regime does play a role in the likelihood
of experiencing domestic terrorism when interacted with other variables.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 OUTLINE
Which types of authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terrorism in
their country? Many scholars in recent years have focused their research on this topic by
disaggregating classifications for authoritarian regimes. This thesis will focus on four
classifications of authoritarian regime types, which are as follows: military regimes, monarchies,
limited multi-party regimes, and one-party regimes. This topic has become more and more
relevant in these recent years in international relations due to the Arab Spring events in Egypt,
Libya, and etc. that shifted focus to why these countries experienced civil strife. Could the type
of authoritarian regime been one of the main reasons for producing civil strife? This topic has
recently received more attention by international relations scholars as we have seen a shift from
studying democratic forms of government to studying autocratic forms of government in more
detail. In addition, it has been more feasible to study authoritarian regimes and domestic
terrorism as data have become more available and updated to keep up with recent events.
Civil strife has been measured more by civil war than by domestic terrorism. This thesis
sees how both forms of civil conflict are inter-related and how regimes play a significant role in
being responsible for producing civil strife. The significance of this study pertains to different
characteristics of regimes and how those characteristics may play a role in determining the
amount of civil strife a country experiences.
Democracies have always been the subject of interest when examining terrorism without
much emphasis on autocracies. In the Global Terrorism Database from the years 1972-2008, we
see that democracies have experienced 22,188 domestic terror attacks while military, monarchial,
multi-party, and one-party authoritarian regimes have combined experienced 19,980 domestic
terror attacks. Therefore, for comparative purposes, this study will shift the focus from
democracies to different types of autocracies and the likelihood of experiencing domestic terror
attacks. In order to be able to demonstrate the relationship, I first provide you with some
examples of different types of authoritarian regimes and the number of total domestic terror
1

attacks that regime has experienced. In addition, I provide a regime score using the Polity IV
scale, which ranges from-10 being the most autocratic to 10 being the most democratic (Marshall
and Jaggers, 2002). After this, I will provide important literature on the subject of authoritarian
regimes, domestic terrorism, and civil war to see what has been done in the past on subject and
how it can be improved. I follow that with theoretical expectations and hypotheses that will be
tested to determine the relationship between authoritarian regimes and terrorism. After the
theoretical framework chapter, I include the methodological chapter, in which I describe the
scientific methods that are used to test the hypotheses, which are followed up with results of the
analyses.
1.2 ONE-PARTY AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
In this section I will provide a case illustration on One-party Regimes. The classification
and definition that will be used will be from Hadenious and Teorell (2012). They classify oneparty regimes as those where only one-party can participate in elections and includes satellite
parties that may be allowed to participate; however, they are not allowed take an independent
position (Hadenious and Teorell, 2012). According to the Global Terrorism database, one-party
regimes have experienced a total of 617 domestic terror attacks from 1972-2008 and had an
average Polity score of -7.40. The case that was chosen to look at the possible effect the type of
regime has on producing domestic terror attacks will be Mozambique. In Figure 1.1, from the
years 1975-2006, Mozambique was classified as three separate types of regimes. Mozambique
was first classified from 1975-1976 as a military authoritarian regime and had an average Polity
score of -8. Then from 1977-1993 they were classified as a one-party authoritarian regime with
an average Polity score of -7.5 and from 1994-2006 they were classified as a multi-party
authoritarian regime with an average Polity score of 5. During the years 1975-1976, they were
classified as a military regime and experienced zero domestic terror attacks; however, the span
was only two years. During the years 1977-1993 they were classified as a one-party regime and
they experienced 132 domestic terror attacks, but then only experienced one domestic terror
2

attack during the years 1994-2006 when classified as a multi-party regime. Here we can see a
really interesting fact that during the 17 years of one-party rule there was a high number of
attacks than the 13 years of multi-party rule. Could it have been the regime itself that produced
these attacks or were there other factors that could have contributed? The civil war going on at
the time likely made it easier for citizens to engage in domestic terror attacks because of the
instability in the country. This is why exploring the concept of different authoritarian regimes
has caught the interest of many, we can see that the differences between these regimes can
trigger domestic terrorism. This thesis looks to capture the effects regime type has on producing
domestic terrorism, when controlling for other possible factors that can be a likely cause like
civil war.
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Figure 1.1: Mozambique
1.3 MULTI-PARTY AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
This section focuses on multi-party authoritarian regimes and used two case illustrations
to explore the possible relationship with domestic terrorism. Hadenious and Teorell (2012) have
classified countries as limited multi-party if they hold parliamentary or presidential elections
where other candidates are able to participate and are independent of the ruling regime, and
3

include those cases where parties were absent but not as a result of prohibition of doing so.
According to the Global Terrorism database, multi-party regimes have experienced a total of
12,499 domestic terror attacks from 1972-2008, and have an average Polity score of 0.16. I use
Kenya and Tanzania to illustrate the possible relationship between regimes and terror attacks. In
Figure 1.2, during the years 1972-1991, Kenya was classified as a one-party authoritarian
regime, with an average Polity score of –6.75, and experienced 12 domestic terror attacks, but
from 1992-2002 they were classified as a multi-party authoritarian regime with an average Polity
score of -2.45 experienced 45 domestic terror attacks. In Figure 1.2.2, Tanzania was classified as
a one-party authoritarian regime during the years 1972-1994 with an average Polity score of 5.87 and experienced one domestic terror attack and classified from 1995-2008 as a multi-party
authoritarian regime, with an average Polity score -1, where they experienced no domestic terror
attacks. The reason for providing these two cases is because they both transitioned from oneparty to multi-party authoritarian regimes during a similar time-frame. However, Kenya
experienced much more domestic terror attacks than did Tanzania. The explanation for this can
be due to the political violence that erupted during the 1992, 1997, and 2002 elections, where
Kenyan citizens were displaced, injured, or killed based on their ethnic background (Njogu,
Ngeta, Wanjau; 2010). The perpetrators of this violence were party supporters, political
aspirants, youth wingers, and organized groups (Njogu, Ngeta, Wanjau; 2010). The violence
occurring against Kenyan minorities could have been the explanation for an increase in domestic
terror attacks in Kenya and only zero in Tanzania even though they were really similar in regime
type.

4

Figure 1.2.1: Tanzania

Figure 1.2.2: Kenya
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1.4 MONARCHIAL AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
This section presents two case illustrations to examine the relationship between regime
type and domestic terror attacks. Monarchy was another category of authoritarian regime type
included by Hadenious and Teorell (2012). In this type of regime a person with royal decent
inherits the position to govern over the state according the practices or constitution and exclude
ceremonial monarchies that do not exercise any power (Hadenious and Teorell, 2012).
According to the Global Terrorism database, monarchial party regimes have experienced a total
of 263 domestic terror attacks from 1972-2008, and have an average Polity score of -8.48. The
two cases that are examined in this section are Bhutan and Iran. In Figure 1.3, Bhutan from the
years 1972-2006 was classified as a monarchy; with an average Polity score of -9.68, and
experienced one domestic terror attack. Iran from the years 1972-78 was also classified as a
monarchy with an average Polity score of -10, but experienced many more domestic terror
attacks with a total of 33. Could it have been that Iranians wanted to overthrow the Shah of Iran
by engaging in domestic attacks against the regime in place? It begs the question to see if once
controlling for these other possible factors, if the type of authoritarian regime matters at all.
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Figure 1.3: Iran/Bhutan
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1.5 MILITARY AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
Finally, I illustrate military authoritarian regimes using both El Salvador and Honduras.
Hadenious and Teoreell (2012) classified a country as a military regime if the military exercised
political power, whether it is directly or indirectly. According to the Global Terrorism database,
military party regimes have experienced a total of 6,601 domestic terror attacks from 1972-2008,
and have an average Polity score of -5.76. In Figure 1.4.2, you can see that Honduras from the
years 1972-1981 was classified as a military authoritarian regime, with an average Polity score 2.22 and experienced 13 domestic terror attacks during that time span. In Figure 1.4., El Salvador
experienced 1,173 domestic terror attacks during the years 1982-1990 while classified as a multiparty authoritarian regime with an average Polity score of 5.33 and 1,068 domestic terror attacks
during 1972-1981, while classified as a military authoritarian regime with an average polity
score of -2.63. The reason I chose these two cases was to illustrate they are neighboring countries
and both were classified as military regimes during the same time frame. However, the
difference was the number of terrorist attacks experience by each country. Honduras experienced
significantly lower rates of domestic terror attacks than did El Salvador, which can be
contributed to the civil war going on in the country at the time. Therefore, this thesis explores
other possible options to explain what produces domestic terror attacks and if the type of regime
holds significant once controlling for factors like civil war.
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1.6 SUMMARY
This chapter provided you with an introduction to the subject of the thesis and how I
intend to study the subject of authoritarian regimes and domestic terrorism. I provided cases to
illustrate the differences in number of domestic terror attacks between the different types of
authoritarian regimes and provided possible explanations to some cases where regime type
appeared to not play a role. For instance, the possible effects civil war the regime might be
experiencing might have led to the high amounts of domestic terror attacks in El Salvador. In the
following chapter I explain what research has been done on the topic and what can be improved
when looking at authoritarian regimes and domestic terrorism. Following this chapter, I present
the theoretical expectations and the hypotheses that are tested. Then I present the research design
chapter that explains what methods are used to test the hypotheses. Following this, I provide the
results of the analysis and conclude with discussion on why this topic should be further explored.

9

Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 OUTLINE
This section of the study focuses on reviewing the existing literature that is relevant in
exploring the relationship between authoritarian regime types and domestic terrorism. First, this
chapter goes into literature on domestic terrorism and how democracies have been the focus of
most studies. Secondly, I introduce research that has been developing regarding the different
types of authoritarian regimes and different types of conflict. Finally, I present the research that
has focused on both domestic terrorism and authoritarian regime types and how it can be
improved upon.
2.2

DOMESTIC TERRORISM
Most of the empirical studies published in the past have found that democratic regimes

are more likely to experience terrorist movements and experience terrorist attacks (Blomberg and
Rosendorff, 2009; Braithwaite and Li, 2007; Eubank and Weinberg, 2001, 1998, 1994; Lai,
2007; Li and Schaub, 2004; Pape, 2003; Piazza, 2008, 2007; Wade and Reiter, 2007). Boehmer
and Daube (2013) mention that the growing literature examining whether democracies are more
prone to terror attacks is due to their open societies and limited governments. Braithwaite and Li
(2007) found in their research that country size, the level of democracy, government capability,
and past incidents all had a positive statistically significant effect on the number of transnational
terrorist incidents. However, their research focused only on transnational terrorist incidents and
did not include domestic terrorist incidents. Li and Schaub (2004) also found that the level of
democracy positive and statistically significant when looking at transnational terrorist incidents.
They used the level of democracy as a control variable to see what effect economic globalization
has on transnational terrorism holding level of democracy constant. Most research has focused
on democracy and transnational terrorism instead of domestic terrorism.
Domestic terrorism has been understudied as most focus has been on international and
transnational terrorism. In addition, the availability of data for domestic terrorism has recently
10

become readily available. Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev (2011) devised a method to be able to
separate data from the Global Terrorism Database into both transnational and domestic terrorist
attacks. They understood that there had to be a differentiation between the two types of terrorism
as they both had different sources and impacts. Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev (2011) believe
that transnational terrorism can have a greater adverse effect on economic growth than domestic
terrorism. Sanchez-Cuenca and De la Calle (2009) argued that more about international terrorism
than they do about domestic terrorism as many quantitative analyses on terrorism focuses
primarily on international attacks because data on domestic attacks was not available. SanchezCuenca and De La Calle (2009) point out that the focus on international terrorism is unfortunate
as it can generate important biases. They argue that the widely shared belief that terrorism
consists of violence against civilians or noncombatants is due to the familiarity with international
terrorist attacks and when you examine domestic terrorism closely you can see that the targets
are police forces and military (2009).
Abadaie (2004) argues that countries with intermediate levels of political freedom are
more likely to experience terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or
countries with highly authoritarian regimes. The results of his research show how geographic
factors may be important to sustain terrorism such as average elevation, tropical weather, and
country area can be powerful predictors of terrorism. Abadaie (2004) failed to find a significant
association between terrorism and economic variables and found consistent results countries in
transition from authoritarian regimes to democracies experience increases in terrorism. This
thesis does not focus on transitions of authoritarian regimes and democratic regimes, but does
see differences in the number of domestic terror attacks when a country transitions from one type
of authoritarian regime to another type of authoritarian regime as shown in Chapter 1.
Boehmer and Daube (2013), contrary to Abadaie (2004), found that there is a significant
association between terrorism and economic variables. They found that domestic attacks appear
to increase as states become wealthier (Boehmer and Daube, 2013). However, when testing for
curvilinear effects development is positive and development squared is negative; which show
11

that when the function of development, terror incidents takes an inverted U-shape distribution
(Boehmer and Daube, 2013). Therefore, the wealthiest and poorest states have fewer incidents
than those states in the intermediate level of development. Boehmer and Daube (2013) found that
democracies with stable regimes and high polity scores are less prone to domestic terrorism.
Boehmer (2014) demonstrated again that there is an inverted U-shape relationship with domestic
terrorism and level of democracy and development; therefore, demonstrating that domestic
terrorism is less likely to occur in states that are wealthy and strongly democratic. Sambanis
(2008) in his research found that terrorism and civil war are closely inter-related. He argues that
civil wars create environmental opportunities for terrorists to attack and also generate the
conditions in which domestic terrorism can occur. This argument is relevant as it is seen in
Chapter 1 how some countries that were experiencing a civil war saw large amounts of domestic
terrorist attacks. This can cause some issues when studying domestic terrorism, as you do not
know how much of the terror attacks can be attributed to civil war and what can be attributed to
other factors. Therefore, this thesis focuses on the effects of authoritarian regime types and
controls for effects that others have used and new controls that they have not used.
2.3

AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
There has been much literature on the topic with regime type usually used as a control or

independent variable on civil strife. Fearon and Laitin (2001) found that more ethnically or
religiously diverse countries were not more likely to experience significant civil war once you
controlled for per capita incomes and growth rates, in addition to using regime type as a control
variable (Fearon and Laitin, 2001). Most of the literature that has focused on regime types has
not concentrated on the disaggregated types of authoritarian regimes.
One of the first to start classifying the types of authoritarian regimes was Geddes (2003),
where she classified authoritarian regimes either as personalistic, militaristic or single party
authoritarian regimes. Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry (2002) were one of the first to use
Geddes dataset in their article Dictatorial Peace, where she examined the likelihood of
12

authoritarian regimes engaging in conflict with each other as most research had focused on the
Democratic Peace Theory.
Fjelde (2011) made mention of the limitations of not using disaggregated data on
authoritarian regime types in her article that focused on authoritarian regimes and civil conflict
between 1973 and 2004. She mentions that “previous research has largely ignored the large
institutional differences between various forms of authoritarian rule and has, both theoretically
and empirically, conflated the risk of civil conflict among these regimes (2011, pg. 215)”. Fjelde
(2011) also mentions that the emerging view that types of political institutions do not have an
influence on the risk of civil conflict is due to usage of aggregate data that hide the variations in
institutional types and the risk that is associated with civil conflict. An example Fjelde (2011)
gives is that on the Polity scale the Chinese communist regime, the Burmese military junta, and
the monarchy of the United Arab Emirates have all at one point held the same score total. Fjelde
(2011) argues that these three types of authoritarian regimes under the Polity scale appear to be
similar; however, it does not demonstrate the different characteristics between the three types of
authoritarian regimes. Fjelde (2011) found in her research that military regimes and multi-party
electoral autocracies have a higher risk of conflict than single-party authoritarian regimes. Fjelde
(2011) however, instead of using the classifications provided by Geddes (2003), she used a
dataset from Hadenius and Teorell (2012), who build on Geddes’ dataset (2003) and make a key
distinction between single-party regimes and military regimes, in addition to creating another
category from single-party regimes where there is a multiparty electorate. A multiparty electorate
is defined as there being “one or more opposition parties are allowed to contest the election, but
the connection between voter preferences and electoral outcomes is marred by irregularities, so
the regime remains authoritarian (Fjelde, 2011; pg. 205)”. The inclusion of this category and the
addition of monarchies into the data by Hadenius and Teorell (2007) have made it more
favorable to researchers like Hanne Fjelde to utilize rather than use Geddes (2003). With regards
to types of authoritarian regimes, Lai and Slater (2006, pg. 113) argue that there has been
“excessive focus on the personalization or institutionalization of authoritarian regimes’ decision13

making procedures has distracted attention from the more critical issue of what institutions these
regimes deploy to enhance social control and secure political incumbency.” They contend that
military regimes are systematically less effective than single-party regimes at developing
different forms of authoritarian institutions, and that they are more likely to resort frequently to
desperate measures to fend off domestic challenges to their control of government (Lai and
Slater, 2006). Therefore, Lai and Slater (2006) found empirical support for their hypothesis that
military regimes will be more than likely to initiate military disputes than single-party regimes.
While this research will focus more on civil strife within a country, there is reason to believe that
if military regimes will employ desperate measures to suppress and civil strife, which will cause
more tension within their country.

2.4 AUTOCRATIC REGIMES AND DOMESTIC TERRORISM
Research examining the differences between authoritarian regime types and the
likelihood of experiencing domestic terrorism has been largely under-researched. Much literature
has focused on literature examining how democracies are more likely to experience domestic
terrorism and transnational terrorism than autocratic regimes. Li and Schaub (2004) stated that
the common argument is that democracies give the political rights of its citizens, which in turn
gives terrorist groups more freedom in association that can explain why democracies might
experience more incident of terrorism. Wilson and Piazza (2013) appear to be the first to focus
on the relationship between the different types of authoritarian regimes and the issue of domestic
terrorism together. They note that “studies have been fixated on the relationship between
democracy and terrorism, arguing that democratic institutions that provide for policy concessions
and tolerate political opposition activity make terrorism more likely (2013, pg.2)”. However, a
shift towards domestic terrorism by Wilson and Piazza (2013) examined the conditioning effects
of authoritarian regime types on terrorist attacks for the periods 1970 to 2006. Their results
show that party-based authoritarian regimes experience fewer terrorist attacks than other regimes
14

and that military regimes experience more terrorism incidents than other types of authoritarian
regimes (Wilson and Piazza, 2013). In addition monarchies and mixed regimes are less likely
than military regimes to experience zero attacks (Wilson and Piazza, 2013). They used the
authoritarian regime typology created by Geddes (2003); however, this study uses Hadenius and
Teorell (2012) typology as it differentiates between one-party and multi-party authoritarian
regimes. This thesis argues that not all party based authoritarian regimes are the same and there
are key differences that differentiate the number of attacks they experience. Therefore, the
Hadenius and Teorell (2012) typology is used as it helps with the distinction of single party
authoritarian regimes and multi-party authoritarian regimes.
2.5 SUMMARY
This chapter covered existing literature on the topics of domestic terrorism, authoritarian
regime types, and some on civil war. As you can see most literature focuses on democracies and
their likelihood of experiencing terrorism. However, you can see a shift from studying
democracies to studying authoritarian regimes. Particularly, you see that research on the
relationship between terrorism and authoritarian regime types is largely understudied with only
one paper examining the relationship between both. Therefore, this study looks to expand the
interest in studying authoritarian regime types and domestic terrorism, as most research has
primarily focused on democracies and terrorism.

15

Chapter 3: Theory and Hypotheses
3.1 OUTLINE
When examining the effects of authoritarian regime type on domestic terrorism, one must
first look at the type of characteristics that make up that particular authoritarian regime type. This
chapter looks at the characteristics of military, one-party, and multi-party regimes and their
ability to produce civil strife. First, I describe military regimes and what characteristics and
behaviors they exhibit that make them likely to experience civil strife. Secondly, I describe both
types of party-based authoritarian regimes, the differences in characteristics between both and
why one is more prone to civil strife than the other. Lastly, this section covers the likelihood of
regimes to experience more domestic terrorism when there is a civil war going on in that
particular regime, and why it is necessary to control for those effects.
3.2 MILITARISTIC REGIME CHARACTERISTICS
Some studies have found that military authoritarian regimes are more likely to initiate
international conflict than other forms of regime types (Sechser 2004, Lai and Slater 2006, Debs
and Goemans 2010, Weeks 2011, Fjelde 2010). Some of the arguments explaining this
occurrence are the lack of popular accountability, fear of severe punishment, diversion,
infrastructural power, and the military mindset of military officers (Weeks 2011). Arguments
regarding why military juntas are more conflict prone lead to assumptions that they will
experience higher rates of domestic terror attacks as people from that particular country might
not be strong enough to engage in a direct civil war. Debs and Goemans (2010) in their research
found that civilian autocrats are significantly less likely to become involved in war than military
autocrats. Aydin and Gates (2007), found that military regimes and genocide were positive and
statistically significant as the characteristics of military authoritarian regimes indicate that they
are more likely to oppress their people and have the means to promote control over their
16

population; therefore, giving people no other option than to asymmetrically engage the regime
with terrorist attacks than all out civil war. The first hypothesis is:
H1: Militaristic authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terrorism
than other types of regimes.
3.3 PARTY-BASED AUTHORITARIAN REGIME CHARACTERISTICS
Fjelde (2010) in her research found that multi-party authoritarian regimes are also more
likely to experience civil war within a country. However, she did not include a separate category
for one-party authoritarian regimes as a separate independent variable in her model. Fjelde
(2010) makes the argument that one-party authoritarian regimes are more likely to have civil
strife than multi-party regimes. The reason this thesis makes this argument is based on the
perception of individuals in any given state. Given the perception of a multi-party elected
government structure, individuals will be less likely to engage in domestic terrorism or civil
conflict because of the appearance of more representation as there is more than one-party
allowed to participate in elections. One-party authoritarian regimes will experience more civil
strife as they are perceived as a corrupt form of government and appears to demonstrate less
representation among its people. Aydin and Gates (2007) found in their research of authoritarian
regime types and genocide that single-party authoritarian regimes were also more likely to
commit genocide, which strengthens the theoretical expectation that one-party authoritarian
regimes are more likely to experience civil strife than limited multi-party authoritarian regimes.
Therefore, the second hypothesis is:
H2: One-party authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terrorism
than limited multi-party authoritarian regimes.
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3.4 CIVIL WAR EFFECTS
In addition, I test another hypothesis for the effects of military authoritarian regimes on
producing domestic terrorism, but this time controlling for the effects of civil war. In some
countries like Mozambique and El Salvador, we saw that the high number of domestic terrorist
attacks could have been attributed to the civil war the country was experiencing at the time. As
we have read in the literature review chapter, when the country is experiencing a civil war,
domestic terror attacks are more likely to occur as there is great instability. The environments
civil wars create also facilitate insurgencies, which use terror tactics as a form of asymmetrical
warfare. Therefore, people find it easier to engage in terrorism when there is a civil war
occurring and the chances of being punished if caught are slimmer. The civil war variables that
were used are from the Correlates of War database (Dixon and Sarkees). There are three different
classifications of civil war which are non-intercommunal, control of central government, and
local/regional issues. The reason for including the three different classifications is to control for
any civil conflict already occurring that can produce domestic terror attacks. This better helps us
understand the relationship between regime type and domestic terror attacks. Therefore, the third
hypotheses that is tested:
H3: Militaristic authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terrorism
than other types of regimes; when controlling for the effects of a civil war for control of
central government.
The fourth hypothesis is:
H4: Militaristic authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terrorism
than other types of regimes; when controlling for the effects of a civil war concerning
local and regional issues.
The fifth hypothesis is:
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H5: Militaristic authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terrorism
than other types of regimes; when controlling for the effects of non-intercommunal civil
wars.
The sixth hypothesis that is tested:
H6: One-party authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terrorism
than limited multi-party authoritarian regimes; when controlling for the effects of a civil
war for control of the central government.
The seventh hypothesis is:
H7: One-party authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terrorism
than limited multi-party authoritarian regimes; when controlling for the effects of a civil
war concerning local and regional issues.
The eighth hypothesis is:
H8: One-party authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terrorism
than limited multi-party authoritarian regimes; when controlling for the effects of nonintercommunal civil wars.
3.5 SUMMARY
The hypotheses were all tested to determine the effects of regime type on domestic
terrorism, and realize that civil war can be a significant indicator of producing the likelihood of
domestic terror attacks. Therefore, including the three types of civil war variables as controls
helps better understand the effects a particular regime has on domestic terrorism when
controlling for other possible explanations. The next chapter will provide the research design to
test the hypotheses discussed in this chapter.
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Chapter 4: Research Design
4.1 OUTLINE
This section of the study includes the methods used to test the hypotheses using
quantitative research techniques. After this section, you see how different concepts are measured
to understand the relationship between the different types of authoritarian regimes and domestic
terrorism, as well as see what other relationships may exist between the variables. First, I
introduce the scope and type of statistical analysis test that was used. Then I describe what
dependent, independent, and control variables I used and how they are measured. Finally, I
introduce and describe two interactive variables, which are included in the final models to see
what effect the interaction has on domestic terrorism.
4.2 SCOPE
This study focuses on the years between 1972 and 2008, to test the effects of
authoritarian regime types on domestic terror attacks. The research uses a cross-sectional timeseries analysis with the unit of analysis being state-years. This study employs a negative
binomial regression estimator to analyze the relationship with authoritarian regime types. The
reason for the use of a negative binomial regression analysis is due to the dependent variable
being a count variable. The analysis consists of running a total of seven models. The first two
models include civil war variables and each were run with a different measure for population.
The next three models each include one of the three different forms of civil war and the last two
models include two different types of interactive variables. The baseline for the authoritarian
regime type variable is democracy, occupation, or other, as I am comparing each type of
authoritarian regime against all other types.
4.3 DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The dependent variable for the research is Domestic Terror Attacks, a count variable
constructed counting the number of domestic terror incidents in any year from 1972-2008
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compiled with data from Global Terrorism Database by Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev (2011).
Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev (2011, pg. 321) define terrorism as “premeditated, politically
motivated violence against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents,
usually intended to influence an audience”. Enders, Sandler, Gaibulloev (2011, pg. 321)
differentiate between transnational and domestic terrorism by defining domestic terrorism as
“homegrown in which the venue, target, and perpetrators are all from the same country…thus,
domestic terrorism has direct consequences for only the venue country, its institutions, citizens,
property, and policies.” Since this thesis focuses on civil strife within a country, it does not
include any incidents of transnational terrorism.
4.4 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
For this study, the independent variables are dummy variables for the different autocratic
regime types. The first independent variable used was Monarchy, which is defined by Hadenious
and Teorell (2012, pg. 5) as “those regimes in which a person of royal descent has inherited the
position of head of state in accordance with accepted practice and/or the constitution.” In
addition, Hadenious and Teorell (2012) exclude ceremonial monarchies where the sovereign
exercises no real political power. Monarchies were coded 1 if they fit the characteristics stated by
Hadenious and Teorell and coded 0 if otherwise.
The second independent variable used was Military, which is defined as the threat or use
of military force “where the armed forces may exercise political power either directly or
indirectly (Hadenious and Teorell, 2012; pg. 6).” They exclude regimes where persons with
military background are chosen in open elections (Hadenious and Teorell, 2012). Military
regimes were coded 1 if they fit the characteristics stated by Hadenious and Teorell and coded 0
if otherwise.
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The third independent variable used was One-party, where only one-party is allowed to
take part in elections and all others are forbidden (Hadenious and Teorell, 2012). They coded “a
small number of non-party candidates may also be allowed to take part and get elected; there
may be satellite parties that are autonomous in name, but which cannot take an independent
position, and competition between candidates from the same (ruling) party may also obtain” as
one-party regimes as well (Hadenious and Teorell, 2012; pg. 6). It is not enough, moreover, that
a regime calls itself a one-party state; elections in such a structure must also be held (Hadenious
and Teorell, 2012). One-party regimes were coded 1 if they fit the characteristics stated by
Hadenious and Teorell and coded 0 if otherwise.
The final regime independent variable in my analysis was Multi-party, which are defined
as regimes that hold parliamentary or presidential elections in which, candidates are able to
participate who are independent of the ruling regime (Hadenious and Teorell, 2012). This
classification holds even when opposition parties refrain voluntarily from taking part in elections
(Hadenious and Teorell, 2012). It also embraces cases where parties are absent, but where this is
not the result of any prohibition against party activities: the candidates in question have simply
chosen to stand for election as individuals (Hadenious and Teorell, 2012). Multi-party regimes
were coded 1 if they fit the characteristics stated by Hadenious and Teorell and coded 0 if
otherwise.
4.5 CONTROL VARIABLES
The research analysis includes 10 control variables to control for other possible effects on
the causes of domestic terrorism. The first control variable is Ethnic Fractionalization variable
used by Fearon (2005), which was interpolated and expanded by Boehmer and Sobek (2013).
This variable was constructed by multiplying two scales of ethnic and religious heterogeneity
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and then adding back the maximum of the two scales. The second control variable is Ethnic
Dominance is also used by Fearon (2005), which was also interpolated and expanded by
Boehmer and Sobek (2013) is a dichotomous variable where 1 equals largest ethnic group
between 45 and 90 percent and coded 0 if otherwise. The third control variable in this study is
Geographic Concentration which measures the population dispersion within a state and is coded
from zero to one (Fearon, 2005; Boehmer and Sobek, 2013). The fourth control variable is the
Log of Population, which is the natural log of the population with the state lagged one year
(Boehmer and Sobek, 2013). The reason for the use of population as a control variable is due to
Piazza (2006, pg.166), who found that countries with large populations will have higher
incidents of domestic terrorism. Piazza believes this happens because “countries with large
populations will have to face higher costs for counter-terrorism policies…terrorists can use large
populations to obscure their operations, escape detection, finance operations, and recruit
members”. The fifth control variable is the Log of GDP Per Capita, which is the natural log of
GDP per capita lagged one year from the Correlates of War database (Boehmer and Sobek,
2013). The sixth control variable is the natural log lagged one year of Military Expenditures from
the Correlates of War database, which will control for the effects of military capabilities in
suppressing domestic terror attacks (Boehmer and Sobek, 2013). The seventh control variable,
which is to be run in a separate model, is the natural log lagged one year of Urban Population
also from the Correlates of War Database, as a measure due to the assumption that terrorist find
it easier to hide in larger Urban Populations (Boehmer and Sobek, 2013). The assumption is that
regimes with large Urban Populations have capable police agencies that are used to combat
domestic terror events and do not rely on the military to do so. Therefore, controlling for the
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effects of these variables helps this research by examining the effects authoritarian regime types
holding these variables constant.
The next control variables are from the Correlates of War Database which has expanded
their COW typology for wars. There are three different civil war variables are run independently
of each other in models 3-8. The reason for controlling for civil war is due to existing literature
addressing the issue that when a country is experiencing a civil war, domestic terror attacks are
more common as a tactic by insurgents. Therefore, we want to control for the effects of civil war
has on producing domestic terror attacks to examine what effect regime has on domestic
terrorism. The first civil war control variable for the Model 5 is Non-Intercommunal CW, a
dummy variable coded 1=if non intercommunal conflict occurred within that year and coded=0 if
otherwise. Inter-communal conflict is defined as wars that involve combat either between or
among two or more non-state entities with that particular state (Dixon and Sarkees, 2012). This
variables includes all civil wars that are not inter-communal and subsumes all those over regional
issues or over the central government. The second civil war control variable for Model 3 is
Control for the Central Government CW, a dummy variable coded 1=if central government civil
conflict occurred within that year and coded=0 if otherwise (Dixon and Sarkees, 2012).
Therefore, it must be a conflict for the control of the central government. The third civil war
control variable for Model 4 is Local/Regional Issues CW, a dummy variable coded 1=if civil
conflict based on local and regional issues occurred within that year and coded=0 if otherwise
(Dixon and Sarkees). Therefore, it must have experienced a conflict or dispute involving regional
or local issues. The reason this thesis is differentiating between different types of civil conflict is
due to not all civil wars are fought for the same causes. Therefore, it is important to see if there is
a variation between the different issues that cause civil wars and to see which types of civil war
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is a strong predictor of domestic terrorism. In addition, for a state to be considered a war
participant it must have either committed 1,000 troops to war of have suffered 100 battle-related
deaths as a minimum required. The reason this paper uses the COW civil conflict database
instead of the UCDP/PRIO database that Fjelde (2011) used is because the COW definition for
civil conflict provides a higher threshold of 100 battle-related deaths compared to UCDP/PRIO’s
25 battle-related deaths threshold. In addition, the COW database provides subtypes of civil
conflict that is very beneficial in studying the effects of authoritarian regime types on civil strife.
4.6 INTERACTIVE VARIABLES
This thesis introduces two types of interaction terms with the regime variable
classifications for future exploration. The first set of interactive terms was the interaction
between the variables types of authoritarian regimes and GDP per capita. This measures the level
of development of a regime and examine if the level of development of the regime type has any
effect on experiencing domestic terror attacks. The higher the GDP per capita in the type of
authoritarian regime the more developed the type of regime will be. The second type of
interactive term was the interaction between regime type and civil war. This measures if the
interaction civil war and regime type has an effect on experiencing domestic terror attacks. The
purpose of this study was to examine the effects authoritarian regime types has on domestic
terror attacks; therefore, examining the interaction of authoritarian regimes has with other
variables to see if that in turn has any effect on domestic terror attacks.
4.7 SUMMARY
In this chapter, you can see the different ways in which I test the hypotheses. There are
several control variables used with the assumption that they have either a negative or positive
effect on domestic terrorism. In addition, there are interaction variables included in separate
models to be able to see what kind of relationship exists between the type of authoritarian regime
and domestic terrorism. The next chapter presents results from the empirical tests.
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Chapter 5: Results
5.1 OUTLINE
This chapter examines the analyses results from all the models. I first introduce results
for Models 1 and 2, which do not include the civil war variables and uses two different measures
of population. Then I present the results of Models 3-5; which each model includes one of the
three different types of civil war variables, and includes predicted discrete changes of domestic
terror attacks. Finally, I present the results from Models 6 and 7, which include the two types of
interaction variables, and include the predicted discrete changes of domestic terror attacks.
5.2 MODELS 1-2
In this section I discuss the results for Models 1 and 2, with the only difference between
the two models was the measurement for population. Table 1.1, shows that for Model 1 I include
total population and for Model 2 I include Urban Population. For Model 1, the analysis
demonstrates that both monarchial and one-party authoritarian regimes have a negative
relationship on terror attacks, meaning they are less likely to experience domestic terror attacks.
Monarchy and One-party both are statistically significant and negative. Military and Multi-party
are both statistically insignificant in this model. Therefore, Military and Multi-party demonstrate
that they have no effect on the likelihood of experiencing domestic terror attacks, than other
regime types.
I now discuss the results of the control variables on domestic terror attacks in this model.
Ethnic Fractionalization demonstrates a negative relationship; therefore, the higher the level of
Ethnic Fractionalization, the less likely the state is to experience domestic terrorist attacks. The
Total Population, Military Expenditures, and the Geographic Concentration control variables all
demonstrated to have a positive relationship on domestic terror attacks. Therefore, an increase in
all three of these variables will lead to an increase of domestic terror attacks.
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For Model 2, you can see similar results as Model 1 which was run with the Total
Population variable. However, the one difference was that the Military Expenditures variable
became statistically insignificant when the model includes the Urban Population variable. All
other variables produced similar results as Model 1. Comparing models, we see that Urban
Population was more statistically significant and had a larger marginal effect on domestic terror
attacks than Total Population. Therefore, in the models I run my analysis with the Urban
Population control variable rather than the Total Population variable. These two models did not
provide any support for neither of the hypothesis which argues that Military and One-party
regimes are more likely to experience domestic terror attacks. The analysis in both models
suggests that One-party regimes are actually less likely to experience domestic terror attacks,
which is contrary to the theoretical expectation.
Table 1.1: Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Domestic Terror Attacks, Regime
Classification, and Control Variables

Domestic Attacks
Monarchy
Military
Multi-party
One-party
Total population
Urban Population
GDP per capita
Military Expenditures
Ethnic Fractionalization
Ethnic Dominance
Geographic
Concentration
N
Prob>Chi-squared
Pseudo R-squared

Coef.
-1.56
0.14
-0.02
-1.59
0.45

Model
1
Std. Err.
0.27
0.13
0.15
0.15
0.06

z
-5.78
1.10
-0.17
-10.77
7.54

-0.03
0.19
0.00
0.04

0.09
0.05
0.00
0.10

-0.41
3.83
-8.84
0.37

1.21
2694
0.000
0.0716

0.27

4.50
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Coef.
-1.32
0.10
-0.02
-1.63

Model
2
Std. Err.
0.30
0.13
0.15
0.15

z
-4.38
0.80
-0.15
-11.12

0.53
-0.11
0.09
0.00
0.11

0.06
0.08
0.05
0.00
0.10

9.11
-1.39
1.87
-7.88
1.04

0.81
2514
0.000
0.0695

0.28

2.86

Significant P-values in bold
(p<.05, p<.01, p<.001)

5.3 MODELS 3-6
This section of the results section focuses on the analysis of Models 3-6, which differs
from Models 1 and 2 because of the inclusion of civil war variables. For Model 3, the civil war
variable that was included was for conflict for the Control of the Central Government. Similar to
the results in Models 1 and 2, Monarchy and One-party have a negative relationship with
Domestic Attacks, which makes them less likely to experience domestic terror attacks. Military
and Multi-party results came back statistically insignificant; therefore, they have no effect on the
likelihood of experiencing Domestic Attacks. Ethnic Fractionalization also has a negative
relationship on Domestic Terror Attacks, which means the higher the level of Ethnic
Fractionalization the less likely domestic terror attacks will occur. Both Geographic
Concentration and Urban Population demonstrate a positive relationship on Domestic Attacks,
which shows that an increase in these variables will increase the number of domestic terror
attacks. The civil war variable for control of the central government was statistically insignificant
in this model. This finding means that when there is a civil war for control of central
government, it does not increase the likelihood of experiencing Domestic Attacks.
For Model 4, the civil war variable measures conflicts concerning local and regional
issues. Similar to the results of Model 3, the only regime variables to be statistically significant
were Monarchy and One-party regimes, and they have a negative relationship on Domestic
Attacks. Military and Multi-party are not statistically significant; therefore, they show that they
have no effect on the likelihood of experiencing domestic terror attacks. Ethnic Fractionalization
was statistically significant and also has a negative relationship with domestic terrorism. Both
Urban Population and Geographic Concentration are again positive and statistically significant,
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and our civil war variable for conflict concerning local and regional issues came back
statistically insignificant. This finding means that when there is a civil war due to local and
regional issues, it does not increase the likelihood of experiencing Domestic Attacks.
For Model 5, the civil war variable for the analysis was Non-Intercommunal Conflict.
Similar to the results in Models 3 and 4, only Monarchy, One-party, and Ethnic Fractionalization
are statistically significant and negatively related, while Urban Population and Geographic
Concentration are statistically significant but positively related with domestic attacks. The civil
war variable for Non-Intercommunal civil war also is also statistically insignificant, as were the
other civil war variables. This finding means that when there is a civil war for control of central
government, it does not increase the likelihood of experiencing Domestic Attacks.
In Table 2.1.1, I include predicted discrete changes in Domestic Terror Attacks, when
including Non-Intercommunal Civil War. Monarchies experience1.74 fewer attacks than other
regimes, holding other variables at their mean. One-party experience 2.78 fewer attacks than
other regimes, holding other variables at their mean. A standard deviation increase in Urban
Population increases the rate of domestic terror attacks by 2.37, holding all other variables at
their mean. A standard deviation increase in Ethnic Fractionalization decreases the rate of
domestic terror attacks by -1.22, holding all other variables at their mean. A standard deviation
increase in Geographic Concentration increases the rate of domestic terror attacks by .35,
holding all other variables at their mean. Here the variables to expect increases in domestic terror
attacks are both Urban Population and Geographic Concentration. Monarchy, One-party, and
Ethnic Fractionalization are all expected to decrease the number of domestic terror attacks,
which provides support against the argument of this thesis.
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Table 2.1: Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Domestic Terror Attacks, Regime
Classification, and Control Variables including Civil War Variables

Domestic Attacks
Monarchy
Military
Multi-party
One-party
Urban Population
GDP per capita
Military Expenditures
Ethnic Fractionalization
Ethnic Dominance
Geographic
Concentration
Control of Cen. Gov.
CW
Local/Region Issues
CW
Non-intercommunal
CW
N
Prob>Chi-squared
Pseudo R-squared

Coef.
-1.23
0.16
-0.07
-1.67
0.56
-0.06
0.05
0.00
0.16

Model 3
Std.
Err.
z
0.30
-4.06
0.13
1.17
0.15
-0.46
0.15 -11.15
0.06
9.39
0.08
-0.67
0.05
1.01
0.00
-7.35
0.10
1.56

Coef.
-1.23
0.17
-0.07
-1.66
0.56
-0.06
0.06
0.00
0.16

0.75

0.29

2.61

0.73

0.29

2.55

0.77

0.55

1.40
1.41

0.87

1.62

2464
0.000
0.069

Model 4
Std.
Err.
z
0.30
-4.08
0.13
1.28
0.15
-0.47
0.15 -11.10
0.06
9.41
0.08
-0.74
0.05
1.10
0.00
-7.45
0.10
1.53

2464
0.000
0.069

Coef.
-1.22
0.16
-0.06
-1.67
0.56
-0.05
0.05
0.00
0.16

Model 5
Std.
Err.
z
0.30
-4.03
0.13
1.21
0.15
-0.42
0.15 -11.12
0.06
9.44
0.08
-0.60
0.05
0.97
0.00
-7.32
0.10
1.52

0.75

0.29

2.62

0.82
2464
0.000
0.069

0.50

1.63

Significant P-values in bold
(p<.05, p<.01, p<.001)

Table 2.1.1 Discrete Changes in Rate for Domestic Terror Attacks, Regime Classification, and
Control Variables with Civil War Variable
Domestic Terror
Attacks
Monarchy
Military
Multi-Party
One-Party
Urban Population
GDP per capita
Military Expenditures
Ethnic Fractionalization

min to max
-1.74
0.40
-0.15
-2.78
53.79
-0.63
1.65
-3.10

standard deviation
increase
-0.52
0.16
-0.05
-1.68
2.37
-0.14
0.28
-1.22
30

Ethnic Dominance
Geographic
Concentration
Non-Intercommunal
CW

0.38

0.19

1.60

0.35

2.97

0.18

5.4 MODELS 6-7
This section of the results analyzes the two interactive terms that are used to test for
interactive relationships that could be related to domestic terror attacks. Given that regimes may
be more or less likely targets for terrorism during civil war or depending on their wealth, I
explore the interaction between the type of regime and Civil War and GDP Per Capita. Model 6
included the interaction between the authoritarian regime variable and Non-Intercommunal civil
wars. The analysis shows that the results are similar to the ones in the previous models when
concerning the Monarchy, One-party, Ethnic Fractionalization, Urban Population and
Geographic Concentration variables. The interesting portion comes from the results of the
interactions, as one of them is statistically significant. The interaction with the military
authoritarian regime variable and civil war was positive and statistically significant. The
estimates demonstrate that when a military authoritarian regime is experiencing a civil war, they
are more likely to experience domestic terror attacks. This is interesting as we saw in previous
models that neither military authoritarian regimes nor the civil war variables were statistically
significant when run independently. Therefore, I find support for my hypotheses that states
military regimes are more likely to experience domestic terror attacks, but is only the case when
interacted with civil war.
Model 7 includes the interaction between the authoritarian regime variables and GDP per
capita. This helped measure the level of economic development of the authoritarian regime to see
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what effect development has on domestic terrorism. The variables that were statistically
significant and demonstrated a negative relationship were Monarchy, One-party and Ethnic
Fractionalization, which was similar to previous models. Urban Population, Military
Expenditures, Ethnic Dominance, and Geographic Concentration were all statistically significant
and demonstrated a positive relationship on Domestic Attacks. The interesting portion of this
model is related to the interaction variables as three of the four interaction variables were
statistically significant. The first statistically significant variable was the level of development of
monarchial regimes. The results show that the higher the level of development of a monarchial
regime, the more likely they will experience domestic terror attacks. This is interesting as
monarchial regimes run independently in previous models came back consistently with a
negative relationship, but when interacted with level of development it shows as a positive
relationship. The second statistically significant variable was the level of development of
military regimes. The results show that the higher the level of development of a military regime,
the more likely they will experience domestic terror attacks. This is interesting as military
regimes ran independently in previous models was consistently statistically insignificant, but
when interacted with level of development it came back as a positive relationship and
statistically significant. The third statistically significant variable was the level of development
of multi-party regimes. The results show that the higher the level of development of a multi-party
regime, the more likely they will experience domestic terror attacks. This is interesting as multiparty regimes run independently in previous models came back consistently statistically
insignificant, but when interacted with level of development it came back as a positive
relationship and statistically significant. One possible explanation as to why wealthier
authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience Domestic Attacks can be attributed to
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capabilities. If a regime is wealthy, so are the increased capabilities to oppress their population.
Another possible explanation can be that the concentration of wealth is in the hands of those in
power. If it appears that wealth is not accessible for others, grievances against the regime can
resort to Domestic Terror Attacks against the government. These interactive terms shed light on
other avenues of exploration and research when concerning what increases the likelihood of
experiencing domestic terror attacks. Civil strife continues to cause problems in many countries,
therefore providing research on what causes civil strife can let leaders know if their country is at
risk and can try to institute policies and changes to address concerns that lead to conflict.
In Table 3.1.1, I include predicted discrete changes in Domestic Terror Attacks, when
including the interaction between authoritarian regime type and civil war. Monarchies
experience1.76 fewer attacks than other regimes, holding other variables at their mean. Oneparty experience 2.80 fewer attacks than other regimes, holding other variables at their mean. A
standard deviation increase in Urban Population increases the rate of domestic terror attacks by
2.28, holding all other variables at their mean. A standard deviation increase in Ethnic
Fractionalization decreases the rate of domestic terror attacks by -1.02, holding all other
variables at their mean. A standard deviation increase in Geographic Concentration increases the
rate of domestic terror attacks by .42, holding all other variables at their mean. The interaction
between civil war and Military experiences 11.8 more attacks than other regimes, holding other
variables at their mean. The predicted discrete of domestic terror attacks shows that Military with
civil war are expected to experience the most number of domestic terror attacks.
In Table 3.1.2, I include predicted discrete changes in Domestic Terror Attacks, when
including the interaction between authoritarian regime type and the level of development.
Monarchies experience 1.88 fewer attacks than other regimes, holding other variables at their
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mean. One-party experience 2.94 fewer attacks than other regimes, holding other variables at
their mean. A standard deviation increase in Urban Population increases the rate of domestic
terror attacks by 1.99, holding all other variables at their mean. A standard deviation increase in
GDP Per Capita decreases the rate of domestic terror attacks by -1.18, holding all other variables
at their mean. A standard deviation increase in Military Expenditures increases the rate of
domestic terror attacks by .82, holding all other variables at their mean. A standard deviation
increase in Ethnic Fractionalization decreases the rate of domestic terror attacks by -1.14,
holding all other variables at their mean. Ethnic Dominance experiences .56 more attacks than
other variables, holding all other variables at their mean. A standard deviation increase in
Geographic Concentration increases the rate of domestic terror attacks by .27, holding all other
variables at their mean. The interaction between GDP Per Capita and Monarchy experience 6.90
more attacks than other interaction variables, holding other variables at their mean. The
interaction between GDP Per Capita and Military experience 5.40 more attacks than other
interaction variables, holding other variables at their mean. The interaction between GDP Per
Capita and Multi-party experience 5.26 more attacks than other interaction variables, holding
other variables at their mean. The predicted discrete of domestic terror attacks demonstrated that
Monarchy, Military, and Multi-party interaction with civil war is expected to experience the
most number of domestic terror attacks. This is an interesting finding as Monarchy alone is
expected to decrease the amount of domestic terror attacks; however, when interacted with GDP
Per Capita they are expected to experience the largest increase of domestic terror attacks
compared to all other variables.
Table 3.1: Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Domestic Terror Attacks, Regime
Classification, and Control Variables with Interactive Terms
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Domestic Attacks
Monarchy
Military
Multi-party
One-party
Urban Population
GDP per capita
Military Expenditures
Ethnic Fractionalization
Ethnic Dominance
Geographic
Concentration
Civil War Monarchy
Civil War Military
Civil War Multi-party
Civil War One-party
Non-Intercommunal CW
Development Monarchy
Development Military
Development Multiparty
Development One-party
N
Prob>Chi-squared
Pseudo R-squared

Coef.
-1.37
-0.03
-0.16
-1.79
0.57
-0.07
0.06
0.00
0.19

Model 6
Std. Err.
0.31
0.14
0.15
0.15
0.06
0.08
0.05
0.00
0.10

z
-4.39
-0.24
-1.02
-11.71
9.44
-0.82
1.13
-6.38
1.81

0.95
2.17
1.84
0.98
0.92
0.04

0.28
2.44
0.54
0.66
0.88
1.02

3.33
0.89
3.42
1.48
1.05
0.04

2474
0.000
0.0719

Coef.
-1.55
0.22
-0.08
-1.90
0.50
-0.43
0.15
0.00
0.24

Model 7
Std. Err.
0.32
0.15
0.17
0.15
0.06
0.11
0.05
0.00
0.11

z
-4.93
1.48
-0.49
-12.31
8.36
-3.93
2.87
-7.31
2.29

0.60

0.29

2.05

0.71
0.62
0.74

0.50
0.25
0.14

1.42
2.46
5.28

0.69
-0.07
2464
0.000
0.0735

0.16
0.14

4.26
-0.50

Significant P-values in bold
(p<.05, p<.01, p<.001)

Table 3.1.1 Discrete Changes in Rate for Domestic Terror Attacks, Regime Classification, and
Control Variables with Civil War Interactive Variable
Domestic Terror
Attacks
Monarchy
Military
Multi-Party
One-Party

min to max
-1.76
-0.07
-0.33
-2.80

standard deviation
increase
-0.56
-0.03
-0.13
-1.72
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Urban Population
GDP per capita
Military Expenditures
Ethnic Fractionalization
Ethnic Dominance
Geographic
Concentration
Civil War Monarchy
Civil War Military
Civil War Multi-party
Civil War One-party
Non-Intercommunal
CW

52.79
-0.84
1.87
-2.67
0.43

2.28
-0.19
0.32
-1.02
0.21

1.91
17.49
11.80
3.73
3.40

0.42
0.10
0.37
0.15
0.14

0.10

0.00

Table 3.1.2 Discrete Changes in Rate for Domestic Terror Attacks, Regime Classification, and
Control Variables with Development Interactive Variable
Domestic Terror
Attacks
Monarchy
Military
Multi-Party
One-Party
Urban Population
GDP per capita
Military Expenditures
Ethnic Fractionalization
Ethnic Dominance
Geographic
Concentration
Non-Intercommunal
CW
Development Monarchy
Development Military
Development Multiparty
Development One-party

min to max
-1.88
0.54
-0.18
-2.94
35.81
-7.16
5.76
-2.92
0.56

standard deviation
increase
-0.64
0.21
-0.07
-1.84
1.99
-1.18
0.82
-1.14
0.27

1.24

0.27

2.31
6.90
5.40

0.15
0.28
0.87

5.26
-0.70

0.68
-0.08
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5.5 SUMMARY
In this chapter, I presented the results from all of the models. The results show which
variables are positively and negatively related to domestic terror attacks and which are
statistically significant and which are not. This section also demonstrated that authoritarian
regimes only increased the likelihood in number of terrorist attacks when interacted with either
the level of development or civil war. I found that there is support for my hypotheses that
military authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terrorism, but only the case
when interacted with civil war and the level of development. I also found that the level of
development in monarchies increases the likelihood of experiencing Domestic Attacks. This is
interesting, as in previous models, Monarchy displayed a negative relationship with Domestic
Attacks. Therefore, I conclude with a summary of findings and their significance in the following
chapter and what could be done for future exploration on the topic.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
This thesis on authoritarian regime types and their effects on the likelihood of
experiencing domestic terrorist attacks provided very interesting results. Overall, there were
mixed results about the relationship between authoritarian regime types and domestic terror
attacks. Monarchies and one-party authoritarian regimes were the only consistently significant
variables, but showed that they are the least likely to experience domestic terror attacks. Military
regimes had a positive relationship with domestic terror attacks, when including the interaction
with civil war and the level of development. In addition, there was a relationship between both
Multi-party and Monarchies with domestic terror attacks, but only when the interaction with
level of development was included. The civil war variables that were included as well were not
significant indicators on the likelihood of experiencing domestic terror attacks. Overall, the
analysis demonstrated that the impact authoritarian regime has on the likelihood of experiencing
domestic terror attacks were for the most part insignificant until you included the interaction
variables.
This study found that military regimes when interacted with GDP per capita and civil war
are more likely to experience domestic terror attacks. This shows support for the hypotheses that
argued that military authoritarian regimes are more likely to experience domestic terror attacks;
however, this is only the case when interacted with either GDP per capita or civil war. Therefore,
the characteristics those military regimes exhibits are more likely to produce domestic terrorism
when they are experiencing a civil war. This can be attributed to military regimes being unable to
remain stable within the regime structure when civil war is occurring. When concerning the level
of development of military regimes, the more developed they are the more they experience
domestic terrorism. This makes sense as with increased capabilities to oppress the population,
people resort to domestic terrorism rather than engage in an all-out civil war. Terrorism is an
easier way to engage an enemy as it is a more asymmetric way hurt the regime, than engage
them in a full civil war.
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An interesting finding was the interaction between Monarchy and GDP per capita.
Monarchies were less likely to experience domestic terrorism, but when interacted with the level
of development they became more likely to experience domestic terrorism. This is a very
interesting result as it demonstrates that people engage in domestic terrorism if they monarchial
regime is more wealthy. This perhaps can be attributed to the concentration of wealth being held
by royal members of the monarchy, which can cause grievances among the rest of the population
that live in poverty. Also addressing these issues can prove difficult as the electoral process is
controlled by those members of the royal family, which leaves people with no other options at
the time than to engage in terrorist activities to promote their agenda.
We also saw that multi-party regimes when interacted with GDP per capita are more
likely to experience domestic terror attacks. This interaction provides support against the
hypotheses that multi-party regimes are less likely than one-party regimes to experience
domestic terrorism; however, this is only the case when interacted with either GDP per capita.
Therefore, the characteristics that multi-party regimes exhibit, are more likely to produce
domestic terrorism when they are more developed. This can also be attributed to the capabilities
a regime has to oppress the population, which leads people to engage in terrorist attacks to
weaken the stability of a regime since engaging the regime directly would be more difficult.
Therefore, the results of this study demonstrate that the type of authoritarian regime does
play a role in the likelihood of experiencing an increase of domestic terror attacks. This is a very
important finding as there has not been much research on what effect authoritarian regime types
has on domestic terrorist attacks, and those who have, did not control for effects of civil war or
included possible interactions with other variables. For future research, to examine the effects of
authoritarian regime types on domestic terror attacks more closely, I could alter the baseline.
Altering the baseline to be military regimes, while removing democracy and other types of
regimes, would help analyze the effects of authoritarian regimes to see what changes can be seen
by dropping non-authoritarian regimes from the model. Countries during the Arab Spring
witnessed vast amounts of civil unrest and conflict which could have produced domestic terror
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attacks, as this study demonstrated that domestic terror attacks can arise by the interaction
between regimes and civil war. This research provides readers with empirical evidence that the
type of regime has an effect on producing civil strife, as those regimes exhibit certain
characteristics that produce instability and grievances amongst its people.
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